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Abstract
l(ith the emergence of network globalization and
advent of Internet being the mqior tool for international
information exchange and p,tatform for the future,
security has always been the nrcst talked about topics.
Much emphasis has been given to security, due to the
fact that networks are very much vulnerable to Denial of
Service attacks or security and access compromise.
Network administrators have ,tften tried their best by
improving their network secutity, however with rapid
surface ofnew exploits; the best way ofensuring that the
system is secure is to attempt penetration testing. This
would be the most effictive way to find exploits and to
proof whether a system is vulnerable. Penetration
testing often allows the secw'ity analyst to Jind new
vulnerabilities.
1. Introduction
The goal ofpenetration testing is to identify the exploits
and vulnerabilities that exist wjthin an organisation's IT
infrastructure and to help confirm the effectiveness 
- 
or
ineffectiveness 
- 
of the security measures that have been
implemented. Indeed, there is rarely a better way to
justifu additional funding for security controls than by
physically demonstrating the flaws that exist in
operational systems. A board <lf directors will instantly
appreciate the value of securilr once they've witnessed
the exposure of confidential inlbrmation by a successful
penetration test.
It's important, though, that p:netration testing should
model real world attacks as closely as possible. In
practice, whilst a real world attacker would typically
spend many months researching a target, a penetration
tester will rarely be afforded this luxury. They need to
complete, in several days, the activities that a real
attacker would spend considerably longer conducting.
This is why it is both useft,l and good practice, to
examine the internal configulation of systems before
attempting an external penetration test. It enables the
tester to quickly gain an insig,ht into an organisation's
IT infrastructure and to model the months of research an
atiacker would expend on creating a knowledge base
about a potential target.
Threats come from many different sources. In practice,
around 70Yo are either int.ernal incidents or are
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accidental or malicious in nature. The remaining 30%
are the result of extemally-related incidents. The most
serious security breaches are, more often than not,
carried out by insiders who have taken advantage of
their intimate knowledge of a company's systems [3].
Penetration testing should, therefore, model the attack
profiles ofpotential threat sources in order to accurately
determine the possibility of an attack succeeding. These
are often split down into several, clearly defined
categories and are listed below in Fig.l. Each of the
individuals described have different attack profiles and
these have to be carefully modeled in order to re-create
attack scenarios that are as realistic as possible.
2. Penetration Testing Model & Method
There are two distinct models for penetration testing -
the Zero Knowledge test and a Full Knowledge test [0].
With the former, the tester is given no insight into the
target systems under investigation. With a Full
Knowledge test, however, the tester is given complete
information about them.
Zero Knowledge tests are useful when trying to ascertain
how vulnerable systems are from the attack profrle of the
Script Kiddie. These are the most common type of
attackers and are generally regarded as no more than
Internet vandals. They typically attack the easiest targets
they can find and with complete disregard. They rarely
conduct any research and normally start an attack as
soon as the target is acquired.
A Full Knowledge attack sets out to accurately model
the attack characteristics of a Master Hacker or
Malicious Insider [8,9,1l]. This is because both of these
individuals will already know a great deal about an
organisation's systems (Malicious Insider) or will carry
out extensive research (Master Hacker) in order to
identiff the best ways of attacking a system.
All penetration tests use a similar methodology
regardless of the actual attack profile that is being
simulated. Target acquisition is the process by which the
tester gains as much information about a target as
possible. This can be done in several ways such as
scanning a web site for names, photographs or contact
telephone numbers.
The use of online whois databases can often retrieve vast
amounts of information such as system administrator IDs
and network addresses. Services such as Companies
House can also offer pertinent information regarding
management employees. Once the network location has
been identified, the tester can then utilise port and
network scanners to identifr available services and the
topology of a network. Tools r;uch as nmap, foing and
icmpquery provide a plethora of information which can
additionally be used to develop a plan of the network.
Nmap provuides the functionality for TCP fingerprinting
and can be used to help identiff the operating system
running on a particular network server. It can often even
reveal the release version that is currently use.
Enumeration is the process of attempting to obtain
user names, network share lnd application version
information from the services running on a server (eg.
Apache 1.3.X, BIND 8.2.1). It's achieved through the
interrogation of network systen.s and banner grabbing or
may involve the use of tools srrch as gnit and netcat in
order to more intrusively retrieve system information
from hosts.
Suipt Kiddie
Has limited or no knowledge c'f how computer systems
work. They rely on pre-written exploits and vulnerability
scanners to find and realiso vulnerabilities release
version that is currently in use.
Master Cracker
Has intimate knowledge of Il' technology and system
code. They find original vulnerabilities, write
customized exploits and sperld much of their time
leaming and finding flaws in n€,w technology.
Malicious Insider
Does not necessarily know mr-rch about IT systems but
does know a lot about YOLIR system. This enables them
to attack a system at its most vulnerable point.
Once the tester has built up a satisfactory
Naive employee
Generally damages IT system; through an inability to
correctly operate even the simplest applications.
Figure I : Profi les of llotential attackers
3. Exposing Vulnerability
Once the tester has built up a satisfactory library of
system information, the vulnerabilities have to be found.
This can be performed by manually matching the
applications present to publicly available vulnerability
lists such as CERT (Compuler Emergency Response
Team) and Bughaq [6,7].
Using this manual method results in a long and drawn
out procedure. Automated tools such as ISS's
vulnerability scanner are available, however, and these
can rapidly provide a conrprehensive list of the
vulnerabilities that exist on a target system.
Whilst useful, tools such as these are unlikely to identiff
the most critical vulnerabilities that affect a specific
system. After all, every IT system is unique and
vulnerability scanners rarely take this into account. What
this means in practice, is that the value of automated
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tools is superceded by the experience and guile of an
experienced penetration tester.
4. Stepping Outside of the Box
Automated tools are designed to operate under the
same set of rules as the test target. It is only by stepping
outside of this environment that it becomes possible to
find 'holes' in a system. The penetration tester must,
therefore, be prepared to step outside of the problem
rather than merely operating within it. This, in fact, is
one of the main differences between Script Kiddies and
penetration testers. Script Kiddies will often pass over
this aspect of testing by adopting a 'shotgun' approach
compared to the 'scalpel' technique of the penetration
tester. Script Kiddies will utilise every resource at their
disposal without any concem as to whether they work.
As long as one of the scripts succeeds, they rarely care
about the rest. The penetration tester, however, has a full
list of potential vulnerabilities and system information
and this can be used to select exploits that will be run
against the target system. The user names and passwords
--collected at the enumeration stage 
- 
now become useful
as they can be employed to gain access to the target.
5. Offensive Operations Model
To properly assess the security of a system,
understandings of the different phases of a successful
attack or intrusion are necessary. By understanding the
risk of exploitation, both can be applied to a structured
list of possible controls to assess the current state of
security, and the directions that need to be investigated.
All successful intrusions share the followine
characteristic phases [2]:
l. Reconnaissance
2. Assessment and Strategy
3. Exploitation / Invasion
4. Maintaining Access
5. Operations
Hackers place different priorities on each stage. In
essence, the more time spent on one step ensures better
results in the following steps. Reconnaissance can go
undetected for considerable lengths of time and the
Assessment and Strategy stage is often completely
undetectable, as it is usually done without contact with
the target. Each phase is conducted in such a way as to
ease the way for the next step, and lower the chance of
getting caught.
In each of those stages, there is the risk of
exploitation. The types of exploits are:
l. Confidentiality (can privacy be compromised?)
2. Integrity (can data accuracy be compromised?)
3. Availability (can data accessibility be compromised?)
The stage of the attack plus the type of exploit
identifies the risk. As an example, in Reconnaissance a
hacker is primarily collecting data. There is no intention
to alter data integrity or availability, although
Confidentiality is affected Therefore at the
Reconnaissance stage of the attack, there is a risk of
Loss of Confidentialify. At the other end of the scale, the
Operations stage is when the h:rcker performs his or her
intent. If he is spying, Confidentiality is at risk. If he is
malicious and intending on causing damage to the
company, Integrity and Availability are at risk. This may
also be the case if the hacker intends only to spy, but
mistakes made along the way h:rve affected Integrity and
Availability.
Strictly speaking, a control is a mechanism to reduce
risk. This may entail blocking data flow to outside
networks, ensuring data integrity, or maintaining its
accessibility. Controls also prcvide functions to notiff
when an attempt has been made to circumvent allowable
access, and an audit trail to accurately document
differences. Most controls an: focused on a limited
number of threats or vulnerabi,ities, and singularly can
be defeated. Because ofthis, a lobust suite ofcontrols is
necessary to mitigate risk.
There are 6 categories ofcontrols [2]:
l. Prevention (will the controls sufficiently prevent an
incident?)
2. Detection (will the contrc,ls sufficiently detect an
incident?)
3. Containment (will the controls suffrciently contain
an incident to a limited target?)
4. Eradication (will the contr,tls sufficiently allow the
vulnerability to be fixed in a timely and accurate
manner?)
5. Recovery (will the controls sufficiently allow
recovery without re-introducing vulnerability?)
6. Follow-up (is there a process to document an
incident? post-mortem reporting?)
Given the 3 types of exploits and the 5 characteristic
phases of a successful intrusion. policies, procedures and
assessments can be developed around the 6 categories of
control. For each stage of an attack, at least one of the
risks of exploitation are usecl, and often in several
possible ways. In other wordsr, for each stage of the
attack, each ofthe 6 categories,rfcontrols are tested and
weighed against their potential associated risks.
5.1. Questioning the Controls around a Given
Risk
In the following series, each stage of an attack is
listed, along with each contrc,l category. The sample
questions are provided to demonstrate assessment of the
associated control. Throughout the actual procedure,
questions are similar in spirit, and tailored to
appropriately assess the control being tested.
5.1.1. Reconnaissance, Assessrnent and Strategy
Reconnaissance, or Recon, ir; the act ofscoping out a
target [3]. This information garhering stage is the most
important step a hacker takes, and all key information is
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considered. The Assessment and Strategy stage is the
sorting of the gathered data to piece together an idea of
what the hacker is attacking. These two stages are
assessed together because Recon is the part of the act
that involves interaction of some sort with the target, and
the Assessment and Strategy stage is usually done
remotely by reviewing the gathered data.
When assessing controls around the Reconnaissance
and Assessment and Strategy stages ofan attack, each of
the 6 areas of control need to be identified. Example
questions are given, although in real-case scenarios,
questions will be more directed to what is being
assessed.
l. Prevention - Do server banners provide too much
information about the system or network? Do login
scripts behave identically for failed usemames as
with correct ones? Is directory browsing through
http disabled?
2. Detection - Is logging effective?
3. Containment - Could information obtained from
the server provide information about neighboring
systems and networks?
4. Eradication - Is a method in place to remove, block,
or change data that may be used to create more
specific attacks against the server?
5. Recovery - Can system functions "recover" old
data that was previously removed to prevent
reconnaissance?
6. Follow-up - Are post-mortem reports generated
when there is potential evidence of data-mining? Is
a record kept of all dates, times, IP addresses and
suspected network-mapping activity for reference
if a penetration or other crime is committed?
5.1.2. Exploitation and Invasion
Once a hacker has gathered enough information and
has pieced together a reasonable amount of information
about the network or system they are attacking, and have
devised an initial plan of attack, it is then possible to
begin the Exploitation and Invasion stage. At this point,
the hacker uses the gathered knowledge and attempts to
access the server through the channels that were found
open.
When assessing the controls around Exploitation and
Invasion, the following types of questions can be asked:
l. Prevention - Have the appropriate security patches
been applied? How are buffer-overflows
prevented? Is the access control sufficiently
strong? Could the system play host to a Distributed
Denial of Service attack?
2. Detection - Would a successful penetration be
detected? Is a method in place to noti$z individuals
who are in authority to react to an incident?
3. Containment - Can penetration of a single service
cause compromise in other servers? Can a single
service be used to control the entire system?
4. Eradication - Do controls allow for scalability when
a compromise dictates change? Do controls protect
potential forensic data?
5. Recovery - Can the systenr be brought back online
in a short period of time following a worst-case
intrusion, without re-inkorlucing the vulnerability?
6. Follow-up - Are detailed rsports of an incident and
its mitigation generated by the system?
5.1.3. Maintaining Access
Once a hacker has penetrated the network (or if the
hack is an inside job) steps are usually taken to make
future accesses easier to conduct. This often includes
installing a back-door program, but sometimes may be
something as simple as setting up a home base under a
seldom-used account name or identiffing a mis-
configured user account with suitable permissions to use
to regain entry.
When assessing controls that limit hackers from
increasing their level of access to improve re-entry, the
following types of questions carL be asked:
l. Prevention - Is effective change detection software
installed and enabled? Is the system administrator
alerted when access leveis and permissions have
changed?
2. Detection - What features e.re running on the system
to detect back-door programs, or critical file-
system changes?
3. Containment - Could a backdoor installed on the
system be leveraged to attack another system?
4. Eradication - Are features in place for reassigning
access levels or permissions if they have been
changed? Are back doors such as Back Orifice
automatically removed?
5. Recovery - Is sufficient change control in place to
void accidentally reintr:oducing a backed-up
version of a back door mechanism? Do these
features inhibit other system functions negatively?
6. Follow-up - Are detailed reports of suspicious fie
permissions generated? Are logs sufficiently
detailed to investigate the source of back doors or
Trojan files?
5.1.4. Operations
This is the most dangerous part of a penetration - the
hacker has all the access required to carry out their
agenda. If it is a spy operation, data could be sent to a
remote collection repository. Il it is a system-mapping
reconnaissance mission, existinl; levels of access may be
used to compromise more systelns on the network.
When assessing controls that limit illicit operations on
systems and the network, the following types of
questions can be asked:
l. Prevention - Is new executable code added to the
system disabled and quarantined?
2. Detection - Is an alarm mechanism in place when
operations are detected? Is someone with enough
authority to investigate and react appropriately
notified of a potential operation?
3. Containment - Is the system architecture robust
enough to limit a hacker to a single environment?
Does manipulation of a single target affect
unrelated functions? Is a mechanism in place to
minimize and control damage?
4. Eradication - When operations are detected, is a
mechanism in place to end the activity and deal
with it appropriately?
5. Recovery - Can a system be coerced into
accidentally recovering a back-door mechanism?
6. Follow-up - Is a mechanism in place to .follow an
incident from the moment of suspicion to the point
that the case is considered closed?
6. Conclusions
No matter what the threat, a professional penetration
test should accurately model the attack characteristics of
the profiles discussed. A methodical and scientific
approach should be used to successfully document a test
and create reports that are aimed at different levels of
management within an organisation.
Penetration testing should never be regarded as a
one-off service. Systems change, threats emerge and
business strategies evolve. Testing should be repeated at
frequent intervals and particularly following major
changes to an IT infrastructure. It's also important to
remember that penetration testing is but just one form of
testing and any organisation should develop an overall
security testing strategy that is tailored to the threat
models and security policies of their organisation.
As can be seen, using the Offensive Operations
Methodology can uncover security flaws in any feature,
configuration or trust relationships, whether they be
technical, architectural, design or policy related. A gup
in any one of the risk-control areas during any phase of
an attack, as described above, is potential security
vulnerability. All the attacks and test procedures are
based on the existence or apparent existence of these
gaps.
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